Over a decade ago, I joined three other well-informed technologists to warn of Iran’s threat to attack the United States with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.
Though such an attack has not occurred—though two of my co-authors have since passed away—their early warning remains valid today, perhaps even more so. At that time, Iran already had orbited satellites and could deploy missiles with intercontinental range capability over the South Polar regions and approach the United States from our then-undefended south.
The orbits of these satellites operated at altitudes capable of enabling a detonation to generate an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) across the lower 48 U.S. states, causing devastating effects including a protracted blackout of the national electric grid and other life-sustaining critical infrastructure.
Seven years earlier, in 2008, Mohammed ElBaradei, then Director of the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), noted Iran could develop a nuclear weapon within six months. On June 20, 2014, former IAEA Deputy General Olli Heinonen reported Iran could build a nuclear weapon within two to three weeks—based solely on Iran’s known capabilities at that time.
Furthermore, the IAEA had discovered Iran experimenting with implosion technology necessary for sophisticated nuclear weapons that could fit on Iranian missiles. Iran reportedly cooperated with its ally North Korea in underground testing, gaining experimental evidence and potential validation of nuclear designs for weapons delivered by ballistic missiles launched southward toward our then-undefended south—missiles capable of launching satellites over the United States.
Given these concerns, we recommended “patching the holes in the National Missile Defense” and modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent while urging regime change through “ousting Iran’s oppressive mullahs via popular revolution.” At that time, an active congressional EMP Caucus existed within House of Representatives members, reflecting serious concerns about this threat and advocating for action.
We have made considerable progress in defending against this threat. Most importantly, we are no longer defenseless against missiles launched toward the United States from any direction. For example, U.S. Aegis Cruisers and Destroyers, along with Aegis Ashore Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems, provide significant sea-based and land-based defenses for us and our allies.
President Trump’s “Golden Dome” offers the possibility of a global defense, particularly in space—building upon lessons from the Strategic Defense Initiative three decades ago. However, recent reports indicate its leadership is failing to meet my challenge from October 20, 2025: “Golden Dome’s management should give priority to space defense.”
I warned that Golden Dome leadership “should not be in Huntsville with its well-known bias toward massively expensive ground-based defenses—the most costly and least effective approach for defending large areas of the United States and its allies globally.” It is unsurprising, at least to me, that since the president’s Golden Dome leadership was located in Huntsville, recent reports confirm they conclude space-based defenses are too expensive while prioritizing more costly ground-based systems.
The Huntsville empire was overruled during the SDI era, as was Air Force Space Command when my predecessor as SDI Director, USAF Lt. Gen. George Monahan, formed a Brilliant Pebbles Task Force to manage efforts directly under him.
President Trump should recall President Reagan’s wisdom in appointing an independent, competent leader—regularly reporting to him—to ensure bureaucratic pressures do not undermine his most critical Golden Dome initiative.
By Henry F. Cooper
Monday, April 27, 2026 at 3:11 p.m. EDT
